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This article addresses the important issue of anchoring in contingent valuation
surveys that use the double-bounded elicitation format. Anchoring occurs when
responses to the follow-up dichotomous choice valuation question are inﬂuenced by
the bid presented in the initial dichotomous choice question. Speciﬁcally, we adapt
a theory from psychology to characterize respondents as those who are likely to
anchor and those who are not. Using a model developed by Herriges and Shogren
(1996), our method appears successful in discriminating between those who anchor
and those who did not. An important result is that when controlling for anchoring
- and allowing the degree of anchoring to diﬀer between respondent groups - the
eﬃciency of the double-bounded welfare estimate is greater than for the initial di-
chotomous choice question. This contrasts with earlier research that ﬁnds that the
potential eﬃciency gain from the double-bounded questions is lost when anchoring
is controlled for and that we are better oﬀ not asking follow-up questions.
R´ esum´ e
Dans cette ´ etude, nous nous int´ eressons au probl` eme de l’ancrage dans les enquˆ etes
d’´ evaluation contingente ` a double oﬀres successives. Un tel probl` eme apparaˆ ıt
lorsque les r´ eponses obtenues sont inﬂuenc´ ees par les oﬀres propos´ ees aux individus.
Nous proposons une m´ ethodologie, issue de la psychologie, aﬁn de caract´ eriser deux
groupes distincts d’individus: un groupe sensible ` a l’ancrage et un autre qui ne l’est
pas. Adaptant un mod` ele, propos´ e par Herriges and Shogren (1996) pour controler
l’ancrage, nous montrons que la prise en compte d’une telle h´ et´ erog´ en´ eit´ e permet
d’obtenir des estimations plus pr´ ecises que celles obtenues avec la prise en compte
d’une seule oﬀre. Ce r´ esultat contraste avec ceux de la litt´ erature, qui trouvent
que le gain de pr´ ecision obtenu avec la prise en compte d’une deuxi` eme oﬀre est
en g´ en´ eral perdu en pr´ esence d’ancrage signiﬁcatif, ` a tel point qu’il vaut mieux ne
pas proposer une deuxi` eme oﬀre.
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21 Introduction
Anchoring is a general phenomenon put forward by Tversky and Kahneman (1974):
“In many situations, people make estimates by starting from an initial value that is
adjusted to yield the ﬁnal answer. The initial value, or starting point, may be suggested
by the formulation of the problem, or it may be the result of a partial computation. In
either case, adjustments are typically insuﬃcient. That is, diﬀerent starting points yield
diﬀerent estimates, which are biased toward the initial values. We call that anchoring”.
This anchoring problem aﬀects, in particular, survey methods, designed to elicit
individual willingness to pay (WTP) for a speciﬁc good. Among such surveys, by far
the most popular one is the contingent valuation (CV) method. Roughly speaking, this
method consists of a speciﬁc survey that proposes respondents to consider a hypothetical
scenario that mimics a market situation. A long discussion has taken place that analyzes
the validity of the contingent valuation method in eliciting individual willingness to pay1.
In the dichotomous choice CV method, the presence of anchoring bias implies that,
“confronted with a dollar ﬁgure in a situation where he is uncertain about an amenity’s
value, a respondent may regard the proposed amount as conveying an approximate value
of the amenity’s true value and anchor his WTP amount on the proposed amount”
(Mitchell and Carson 1989). Herriges and Shogren (1996) propose a model that takes
into account the eﬀect of anchoring. It turns out that there is an important loss of
eﬃciency in the presence of substantial anchoring. The purpose of this paper is to
address this issue.
To the best of our knowledge, anchoring has always been considered as a phenomenon
aﬀecting the population as a whole. Little attention has been paid to the fact that
some individuals may anchor their answers while others may not2. The assumption
of homogeneous anchoring may be hazardous as it may lead to econometric problems.
Indeed, it is well known in standard regression analysis that individual heterogeneity can
be a dramatic source of misspeciﬁcation and if it is not taken into account, its results
can be seriously misleading. In the context of this paper, the presence of two groups or
types of people (those who are subject to anchoring and those who are not), is a type
of individual heterogeneity that could aﬀect empirical results in CV surveys.
The major issue is how to conceive a measurement of individual heterogeneity with
respect to anchoring. In other words, if we assume that individuals are of two types,
then the question is how can we identify these two distinct groups of people in practice?
In this paper, we propose to develop a methodology that borrows tools from social
1see Mitchell and Carson 1989, Hausman 1993, Arrow et al. 1993, Bateman and Willis 1999
2Grether (1980) studies decisions under uncertainty and shows that, although the representativeness
heuristic explains some of the individuals’ behaviors, Bayesian updating is still accurate for other indi-
viduals. He suggests that, being familiar with the evaluation of a speciﬁc event (in his case, acquired
through repeating evaluations in the experiment) leads to more ﬁrmly held opinions and, consequently,
to a behavior more in line with standard economic assumptions. This is also what John List suggests
when he compares the behavior of experienced subjects (through previous professional trade experi-
ences) and unexperienced subjects (List 2004)
3psychology that will allow us to identify the two groups of people. Using the dichotomous
choice model developed by Herriges and Shogren (1996), we control for anchoring for
each group separately. A noticeable empirical result of our methodology is that when
we allow the degree of anchoring to diﬀer between those two groups, the eﬃciency of the
double-bounded model improves considerably. This contrasts with previous research that
ﬁnds that the eﬃciency gains from the double-bounded model are lost when anchoring
is controlled for.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review some possible sources
of heterogeneity in the context of anchoring. Then, we concentrate on a particular
form of heterogeneity and we present the methodology that we use to identify it in
practice. In section 3, we extend the model proposed by Herriges and Shogren (1996) in
order to develop a speciﬁc econometric model with heterogeneous anchoring. Finally, in
section 4, we apply our methodology and econometric model to a French dedicated CV
survey. Conclusions are drawn in section 5.
2 Conformism as a source of heterogeneity
Heterogeneity can be deﬁned in many diﬀerent ways. In this section, we are interested in
a form of heterogeneity linked to the problem of anchoring, that is to say involving the
behavior of survey respondents induced by the survey itself. More precisely, we would
like to investigate whether there is heterogeneity with respect to the degree of anchoring
on the bid in the initial valuation question. Thus, a clear distinction should be made
between heterogeneity that leads to diﬀerent anchoring behaviors and heterogeneity that
relates to WTP directly. The latter sort of heterogeneity can be treated, as in standard
linear regression model, by the use of regressor variables in speciﬁc econometric models
and is not related at all to the problem of anchoring. The type of heterogeneity we are
interested in here, however, calls for treatment of a diﬀerent nature.
The economic literature on contingent valuation in particular, and on survey data in
general, often mentions a particular source of heterogeneity. This source concerns the
fact that some individuals may hold a “steadier point of view” than others. Alterna-
tives versions are “more precise beliefs”, “higher level of self-conﬁdence”, “well deﬁned
preferences”, etc...A good example of such a notion is “one might expect the strongest
anchoring eﬀects when primitive beliefs are weak or absent, and the weakest anchoring
eﬀects when primitive beliefs are sharply deﬁned” (Green et al. 1998). It is quite clear
that all these statements share some common feature. However it seems that economic
theory lacks a precise deﬁnition of this, even if the notions mentioned are very intuitive.
Thus, many authors are confronted with a “missing notion” since economic theory does
not propose a clear deﬁnition of this type of human characteristic.
Psychology proposes a notion of “conformism to the social representation” that could
ﬁll this gap. In order to test if an individual representation is a rather conformist one,
we compare it to the so called “social representation”. Individuals whose representation
diﬀers from the social representation could be considered as “non-conformists”. The
4basic idea, supported by social psychology, is that individuals who diﬀer from the so-
cial representation are less prone to be inﬂuenced3. It leads us naturally to wonder if
individuals that are less prone to be inﬂuenced are also less prone to anchoring. Before
testing this last hypothesis with an econometric model, we develop a method to isolate
“non-conformist” individuals.
Method
Individuals have, for each particular subject, a representation (i.e. a point of view).
Representations are deﬁned in a broad sense by social psychologists,4 since an individual
representation is deﬁned as a form of knowledge that can serve as a basis for perceiving
and interpreting reality, as well as for orienting one’s behavior. This representation may
either be composed of stereotypes or of more personal views.
The general principle that underlies the above methodology consists of detecting
individuals who hold a representation of the object to be evaluated that diﬀers from
that of the majority. The methodology allows us to identify an individual who holds a
representation which diﬀers from the majority one. We restrict our attention here to a
quantitative approach using an open-ended question. This is the usual way to gather
quantitative information on an individual representation at low cost (Verg` es 1994). After
cleaning the data, we use an aggregation principle in order to establish the majority point
of view (which is a proxy for the so called social representation). Then it is possible
to compare individual and social representations. Using a simple criterion, we sort
individuals into two sub-samples. Those who do not diﬀer from the majority point of
view are said to be in conformity with the majority while the others are said to be
diﬀerent from the majority. The methodology consists of four steps summarized in the
ﬁgure 1 and described in detail in what follows.
Step 1: A representation question
At a formal level, an individual representation of a given object is an ordered list
of terms that one freely associated with the object. Such a list is obtained through
open-ended questions such as “what does this evoke to you?”.
Step 2: Classiﬁcation
As mentioned above, an individual representation is captured through an ordered list
of words. A general result is that the total number of diﬀerent words used by the sample
of individuals considered is quite high (say 100 to 500 depending on the complexity of the
object). This imposes a categorization that puts together words that are close enough.
This step is the only one which leaves the researcher with some degrees of freedom.
After the categorization, each individual’s answer is transformed into an ordered list
of categories. It is then possible to express an individual representation as an ordered list
3Moscovici (1998a, 1998b)
4Moscovici (1961, 1998a), Farr (1998), Viaud and Roland-Levy (2000)
5Step 1 : A representation question
What are the words which come to your mind when ... ?
Result : individual lists of words and expressions
Step 2 : Classiﬁcation
Coding words and expressions by ”frame of reference”
Result : Ordered lists of categories (incomplete)
Step 3 : Aggregation
Majority voting as the aggregation principle
Result : Test for transitivity of the social representation
and identiﬁcation of the Condorcet winner
Step 4 : Segmentation
Distinguishing sub-populations in the sample
Result : Identiﬁcation of conformists
Conformists Non conformists
Final result :
Conformity as a dummy variable
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Figure 1: Methodology
of categories, rather than words. However, at the end of this categorization, we are left
with individual representations containing doubles, i.e. individual representations with
several attributes which belong to the same category. To obtain transitive individual
representations, we need to suppress the less ranked citations belonging to the same
category.
Those individual representations, namely ordered lists of words, could at a formal
level be considered as an ordinal preference over the set X of possible categories. As
the question that is used to elicit individual representation is open-ended, individual
lists could be of various length. So, preferences could be incomplete. Those individual
representations will in turn aggregate to form the social representation.
Step 3: Aggregating representations
Using a majoritarian device5, it is possible to proceed in a non ambiguous manner
in order to identify the social representation on the basis of individual ones. A social
5The majority principle will then consist of a pairwise comparison of each of the attributes. For each
pair (X,Y ), the number of individuals who rank X before Y is compared to the number of individuals
who rank Y before X. The individuals who do not cite either X or Y since incomplete individual
representation may exist do not contribute to the choice between X and Y . Adding to this, when an
individual cites X and not Y , X is considered as superior to Y .
6representation, whenever it exists, will then be a complete and transitive order over the
set X.
An important property of the majority principle is that it may lead to non transitive
social preferences, the so called Condorcet paradox. Indeed, X may be ranked before Y
at the social level and Y ranked before another attribute Z with X not ranked before Z.6
Further results even show that the probability of getting a transitive social preference
becomes very small as the number of elements in X grows. We will then consider the
use of the majority principle as a test for the existence of a social representation: if a set
of data leads to a transitive social representation, the social representation is coherent.
Step 4: Segmentation
Thanks to our previous results, it is possible to sort individuals according to the way
they build their representations. In order to do so, we consider individuals who do not
refer to the Condorcet winner (i.e. the top element of the social representation). Recall
that preferences are incomplete, so that a typical individual preference does not display
all of the elements of X, otherwise all individuals include the Condorcet winner in their
preference. In practice, the Condorcet winner refers to elements obviously associated to
the object, i.e among the very ﬁrst words that come to mind when talking about the
object.
We are then left with two categories of individuals. This leads to a breakdown of
individuals into two sub-samples: the ones who did mention the Condorcet winner (con-
formists) and the ones who did not (non-conformists). Finally, one has a dummy variable
that sorts individuals into two categories and that identiﬁes individual heterogeneity. It
remains for us to test if such a variable can indeed play a role in anchoring bias, based
on a speciﬁc econometric model. We develop such a model in the next section.
3 Econometric Models
There exist several ways to elicit individuals’ WTPs in CV surveys. The use of discrete
choice format in contingent valuation surveys is strongly recommended by the work of
the NOAA panel (Arrow et al. 1993). It consists of asking a bid to the respondent
with a question like if it costs $x to obtain ..., would you be willing to pay that amount?
Indeed, one advantage of the discrete choice format is that it mimics the decision making
task that individuals face in everyday life since the respondent accepts or refuses the bid
proposed.
One drawback of this discrete choice format is that it leads to a a qualitative depen-
dent variable (the respondent answers yes or no) which reveals little about individuals’
WTP. In order to gather more information on respondents’ WTP, Hanemann (1985) and
Carson (1985) proposed to add a follow-up discrete choice question to improve eﬃciency
of discrete choice questionnaires. This mechanism is known as the double bounded
6See Laslier (1997) for details.
7model. This basically consists of asking a second bid to the respondent, greater than
the ﬁrst bid if the respondent asked yes to the ﬁrst bid and lower otherwise. The key
disadvantage of the double-bounded model is that individuals may anchor their answers
to the second bid on the ﬁrst bid proposed. Herriges and Shogren (1996) show that,
in the presence of anchoring bias, information provided by the second answer is lost
such that the single bounded model can become more eﬃcient than the double bounded
model.
In this section, we present these diﬀerent models proposed in the literature: the single
bounded, double bounded models and the Herriges and Shogren (1996) anchoring model.
Finally, we develop an econometric model of anchoring that depends upon individual
heterogeneity.
Single bounded model
Let us ﬁrst consider Wi, the individual i’s prior estimate of his willingness to pay, which
is deﬁned as follows
Wi = xi(β) + ui (1)
where the unknown parameters β and σ2 are respectively a k × 1 vector and a scalar,
where xi is a non-linear function depending on k independent explanatory variables. The
error term ui are Normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2. The number of
observations is equal to n and the error terms ui are normally distributed with mean zero
and variance σ2. In the single bounded mechanism, the willingness to pay (WTP) of the
respondent i is not observed, but his answer to the bid bi is observed. The individual i
answers yes to the bid oﬀer if Wi > bi and no otherwise.
Double bounded model
The double bounded model, proposed by Hanemann (1985) and Carson (1985), consists
of asking a second bid (follow-up question) to the respondent. If the respondent i answers
yes to the ﬁrst bid, b1i, the second bid b2i is higher and lower otherwise. The standard
procedure, Hanemann (1985) and Carson (1985), assumes that respondents’ WTPs are
independent of the bids and deals with the second response in the same manner as the
ﬁrst discrete choice question,
W1i = xi(β) + ui and W2i = W1i (2)
The individual i answers yes to the ﬁrst bid oﬀer if W1i > b1i and no otherwise. He
answers yes to the second bid oﬀer if W2i > b2i and no otherwise. Hanemann, Loomis,
and Kanninen (1991) compare the double bounded model with the single bounded model
and show that the double bounded model can yield eﬃciency gains.
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The double bounded model model assumes that the same random utility model gener-
ates both responses to the ﬁrst and the second bid. In fact, introduction of follow-up
questioning can generate inconsistency between answers to the second and ﬁrst bids. To
deal with inconsistency of responses, Herriges and Shogren (1996)’s approach considers
a model in which the follow-up question can modify the willingness to pay. According
to them, respondents combine their prior WTP with the value provided by the ﬁrst bid,
this anchoring eﬀect is then deﬁned as follows
W1i = xi(β) + ui and W2i = (1 − γ)W1i + γ b1i (3)
where the parameter 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. Herriges and Shogren (1996) show that, when an
anchoring bias exists, eﬃciency gains provided by the double-bounded model disappear.
Information yielded by the answers to second bid is diluted in the anchoring bias phe-
nomenon.
Anchoring model with heterogeneity
In the presence of individual heterogeneity, results based on standard regression can be
seriously misleading if this heterogeneity is not taken into account. In the preceding an-
choring model, Herriges and Shogren (1996) consider that all individuals are inﬂuenced
by the ﬁrst bid: the anchoring bias parameter γ is the same for all individuals. However,
if only some respondents combine their prior WTP with the information provided by
the ﬁrst bid, the others not, it means that individual heterogeneity is present.
Let us consider that we can divide respondents into two distinct groups: one subject
to anchoring and another one not subject to anchoring. Then, we can deﬁne a new
model as follows
W1i = xi(β) + ui and W2i = (1 − Iiγ)W1i + b1i Ii γ (4)
where Ii is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 when individual i belongs to one group
and 0 if he belongs to the other group. Note that, if Ii = 1 for all respondents, our
model becomes the model proposed by Herriges and Shogren (1996) and if Ii = 0 for all
respondents, our model becomes the standard double bounded model. The model can
also be deﬁned with an heterogeneity based on individual characteristics rather than
two groups, replacing Ii by a variable Xi taking any real values.
Estimation
The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable: the willingness-to-pay Wi is unknown
and we observe answers only. Thus, estimation methods appropriate to the qualitative
dependent variable are required. The single bounded model can be estimated with a
9standard probit model. Models with follow-up questions can easily be estimated by
maximum likelihood using the log-likelihood function
l(y,β) =
n X
i=1

r1i r2i log

P(yes,yes)

+ r1i (1 − r2i) log

P(yes,no)

+ (1 − r1i)r2i log

P(no,yes)

+ (1 − r1i)(1 − r2i) log

P(no,no)

(5)
where r1 (resp. r2) is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the answer to the ﬁrst
bid (resp. to the second) is yes, and is equal to 0 if the answer is no. For each model,
we need to derive the following probabilities: P(yes,no) = P(b1 < Wi < b2) and
P(yes,yes) = P(Wi > b2).
P(no,no) =P(Wi < b2) P(no,no) =P(b2 < Wi < b1) (6)
P(yes,no)=P(b1 < Wi < b2) P(yes,yes)=P(Wi > b2) (7)
For the anchoring model with heterogeneity, we calculate these probabilities:
P(no,no) =Φ[((b2i − b1iIiγ)/(1 − Iiγ) − xi(β))/σ] (8)
P(yes,no) =Φ[(b1i − xi(β))/σ] − Φ[((b2i − b1iIiγ)/(1 − Iiγ) − xi(β))/σ] (9)
P(no,yes) =Φ[((b2i − b1iIiγ)/(1 − Iiγ) − xi(β))/σ] − Φ[(b1i − xi(β))/σ] (10)
P(yes,yes)=1 − Φ[((b2i − b1iIiγ)/(1 − Iiγ) − xi(β))/σ] (11)
The anchoring model, proposed by Herriges and Shogren (1996) is a special case, with
Ii = 1 for i = 1,...,n. The double bounded model is a special case, with γ = 0.
4 Application
In order to test our model empirically, this article uses the main results of a contin-
gent valuation survey which was carried out within a research program that the French
Ministry in charge of environmental aﬀairs started in 1995. It is based on a contingent
valuation survey which involves a sample of users of the natural reserve of Camargue7.
The purpose of the contingent valuation survey was to evaluate how much individuals
were willing to pay to preserve the natural reserve using an entrance fee. The survey
was administered to 218 recreational visitors during the spring 1997, using face to face
7The Camargue is a wetland in the south of France covering 75 000 hectares. The Camargue is a
major wetland in France and is host to many fragile ecosystems. The exceptional biological diversity
is the result of water and salt in an ”amphibious” area inhabited by numerous species. The Camargue
is the result of an endless struggle between the river, the sea and man. During the last century, while
the construction of dikes and embankments salvaged more land for farming to meet economic needs, it
cut oﬀ the Camargue region from its environment, depriving it of regular supplies of fresh water and
silt previously provided by ﬂooding. Because of this problem and to preserve the wildlife, the water
resources are now managed strictly. There are pumping, irrigation and draining stations and a dense
network of channels throughout the river delta. However, the costs of such installations are quite large.
10interviews. Recreational Visitors were selected randomly in seven sites all around the
natural reserve. The WTP question used in the questionnaire was a dichotomous choice
with follow-up. There was a high response rate (92.6 %)8.
4.1 Conformists and Non-Conformists
The questionnaire also contains an open-ended question related to the individual repre-
sentations of the Camargue. This open-ended question yields the raw material to divide
the respondents population into two groups: conformists and non conformists. This is
done using the methodology presented in section 2, through the following steps:
Step 1: What are the words that come to your mind when you think about the Camar-
gue?
In the questionnaire, respondents were asked to freely associate words to the Camar-
gue. This question were asked before the contingent valuation scenario in order to not
inﬂuence the respondents’ answers. Respondents used more than 300 diﬀerent words or
expressions in total.
Step 2: A categorization into eight categories
A basic categorization by frame of reference leads to eight diﬀerent categories. For
instance, the ﬁrst category is called “Fauna and Flora”. It contains all attributes which re-
fer to the animals of Camargue and local vegetation (fauna, 62 citations, birds, 44, ﬂora,
44, bulls, 37, horses, 53, ﬂamingos, 36, etc.). The others categories are “Landscape”,
“Disorientation”, “Isolation”, “Preservation”, “Anthropic” and “Coast”. A particular ex-
ception is the category “Nature” which only contains the word nature which can hardly
fall in one of the previous categories. There exists a ninth category which put together
all attributes which do not refer to any categories mentioned below9.
Step 3: Existence of a transitive social representation
After consolidating the data in step 2, we were left with 218 incomplete preferences
over the set X containing our eight categories. A majoritarian pairwise comparison
results are presented in Table 1. The result between two categories should be read in
the following way: the number of line i and column j is the diﬀerence between the
number of individuals who rank category i before category j and the individuals who
order category j before i. For instance, we see that “Fauna and Flora” is preferred by
a strong majority to “Isolation” (a net diﬀerence of 85 voices for “Fauna and Flora”).
After aggregation through the majoritarian principle, the social representation is then
transitive and thus provides a coherent social representation.
8See Claeys-Mekdade, Geniaux, and Luchini (1999) for a complete description of the contingent
valuation survey.
9After categorization and deletion of doubles, the average number of attributes evoked by the re-
spondents falls from 5.5 to 4.0.
11Attributes F-F Land. Isol. Preserv. Nat. Anth. Disor. Coast
Fauna-Flora 0 40 85 73 107 147 146 144
Landscape - 0 48 53 86 117 123 126
Isolation - - 0 6 47 56 78 73
Preservation - - - 0 25 51 62 65
Nature - - - - 0 14 11 28
Anthropic - - - - - 0 9 17
Disorientation - - - - - - 0 12
Coast - - - - - - - 0
Table 1: Majoritarian pairwise comparison
Step 4: Conformists and non conformists
The top element, namely the Condorcet winner, concerns all aspects relating to bio-
diversity10. This is not surprising since the main interest of the Camargue (as presented
in all related commercial publications) is the “Fauna and Flora” category. Talking about
the Camargue without mentioning any of those aspects is thus remarkable. Individuals
who do so are considered as non conformists (38 individuals), while individuals who do
are considered as conformists (180 individuals). Recall the survey was admistrated inside
Camargue after individuals have visited it. Thus, they are fully aware of the importance
of fauna and ﬂora in Camargue. Not referring to those aspects is thus not a hazard.
4.2 Econometric results
We consider the dummy variable conformists/non-conformists, obtained with the four
steps described above, and estimate the diﬀerent models described in section 3, using a
linear model (Mac Fadden and Leonard 1993). In practice, a value of particular interest
is the mean of WTP, evaluated by
ˆ µ = n
−1
n X
i=1
xi(ˆ β) (12)
and the WTPs estimated dispersion is equal to ˆ d = ˆ σ (Hanemann and Kanninen 1999).
Table 2 presents estimated means of WTP ˆ µ, as deﬁned in (12), and the disper-
sions of WTP distributions ˆ σ for the single bounded, double bounded, anchoring and
anchoring with heterogeneity models. From this Table, it is clear that the standard
errors, in parentheses, decrease considerably when one uses the usual double-bounded
model (column 2) instead of the single bounded model (column 1). This result con-
ﬁrms the expected eﬃciency gains provided when the second bid is taken into account
(Hanemann, Loomis, and Kanninen 1991). However, estimates of the mean WTP in
10Full description of the data and more details are available in Hollard and Luchini (1999).
12Single-bounded Double-bounded Anchoring Anchoring
model model model model with
heterogeneity
Mean 113.59 81.79 127.63 99.39
WTP ˆ µ (4.80) (2.41) (4.62) (3.29)
WTP 45.42 42.74 82.44 57.23
dispersion ˆ σ (23.65) (5.23) (41.22) (11.46)
Anchoring eﬀect ˆ γ - - 0.52 0.36
(0.23) (0.14)
Table 2: Parameter estimates in French Francs (standard errors in parenthesis)
both models are very diﬀerent: in the double bounded model the mean WTP would
belong to the interval [77;86] with a conﬁdence level at 95%11, instead of the conﬁdence
interval [104;123] in the single bounded model. Such inconsistent results lead us to
consider that anchoring eﬀect could be present, as suggested by Herriges and Shogren
(1996). Then, we estimate a model with anchoring eﬀect, as deﬁned in (3). Results,
given in column 3, show that the anchoring parameter, ˆ γ = 0.52, is signiﬁcant (P-value
= 0.0124). This test conﬁrms the existence of an anchoring eﬀect in the respondents’
answers. When correcting for anchoring eﬀect, the mean WTP belongs to the conﬁdence
interval [118;136] which intersects the conﬁdence interval of the single bounded model:
results are now consistent. However, standard errors increase considerably, so that, even
if follow-up questioning increases precision of parameter estimates (column 2), eﬃciency
gains are lost once the anchoring eﬀect is taken into account (column 3). According to
this result, “the single-bounded approach may be preferred when the degree of anchoring
is substantial” (Herriges and Shogren, 1996, p.124).
According to the distinction between conformists and non conformists, we now tackle
the assumption of homogeneous anchoring. We ﬁrstly estimate a more general model
than (4), with two distinct parameters of anchoring for these two groups, respectively
conformists and non conformists. This is done from a model with W2i = [1−Iiγ1−(1−
Ii)γ2]W1i+[Iiγ1+(1−Ii)γ2]b1i replacing W2i in (4). It allows us to test if non-conformists
are not subject to anchoring with the null hypothesis γ2 = 0. A likelihood ratio test is
equal to 1.832 (P-value=0.1759), so that we cannot reject the null hypothesis and we
therefore select the model (4), where anchoring only aﬀects the conformists.
Estimates of the model, where only conformists are subject to anchoring, are given in
column 4. The anchoring parameter, ˆ γ = 0.36, is clearly signiﬁcant (P-value = 0.005).
In other words, it means that conformists use information provided by the ﬁrst bid in
combining their prior WTP with this new information, but not the non-conformists.
Moreover, it is clear from Table 2 that standard errors from column 4, in parentheses,
11this conﬁdence interval is deﬁned as [81.79 ± 1.96 × 2.41].
13Variables Single-bounded Anchoring Anchoring model
model model with heterogeneity
Constant 35.43 (57.27) 83.57 (68.43) 61.16 (44.18)
Distance home-natural site 9.30 (5.30) 7.07 (4.45) ? 4.67 (2.17)
Using a car to arrive -61.71 (41.08) -79.47 (49.04) ? -58.22 (26.81)
Employee ? 95.86 (46.86) 84.27 (49.09) ? 65.36 (27.77)
Middle class 109.96 (63.60) 99.89 (56.95) ? 74.66 (28.96)
Inactive 52.58 (38.44) 57.12 (40.87) 48.80 (27.99)
Working class 97.28 (68.29) 81.27 (81.66) 62.00 (53.27)
White collar 80.33 (42.16) 78.88 (44.24) ? 59.66 (24.65)
Visiting with family 4.71 (29.61) 12.79 (31.36) 13.01 (22.71)
Visiting Alone 61.11 (101.67) 122.37 (95.03) 89.18 (52.97)
Visiting with a group 44.79 (47.90) 3.70 (46.24) 4.22 (32.65)
First visit 51.42 (35.29) 18.56 (23.50) 15.59 (16.31)
New facilities proposed 56.93 (32.12) 57.29 (33.06) ? 41.94 (15.59)
Other ﬁnancing proposed -32.03 (27.60) -28.19 (21.84) -19.01 (12.87)
South-West -24.18 (33.57) -42.04 (40.61) -28.48 (24.24)
South-East 42.04 (58.26) 52.72 (52.06) 40.73 (32.61)
Questionnaire type -28.19 (23.34) -13.15 (17.82) -10.50 (11.97)
Investigator 1 23.44 (56.29) 6.12 (47.50) 8.26 (32.07)
Investigator 2 -17.12 (57.52) -39.70 (54.49) -29.92 (35.09)
Table 3: Parameter estimates, standard errors in parentheses (?: signiﬁcant at 95%)
are signiﬁcantly reduced compared to those of column 1. Hence, although the single-
bounded model provides better results in terms of eﬃciency than the model with constant
anchoring, our model with anchoring and heterogeneity yields more eﬃcient estimates.
In addition, the conﬁdence interval of the mean WTP in the model with anchoring and
heterogeneity is equal to [93;106]. This interval intersects the conﬁdence interval in the
single bounded model [104;123] and so, results are consistent. These results show that
the estimate of the mean WTP is smaller and more precise in the anchoring model with
heterogeneity than in the single bounded model.
Table 3 presents full estimation results. It is worth noting that the introduction
of heterogeneity provides a better estimation since many variables are now statistically
signiﬁcant. Indeed, the heterogeneous model exhibits six signiﬁcant variables. This
contrasts with the single-bounded model which exhibits only one signiﬁcant variable.
Our results therefore suggest that when anchoring is understood as a heterogeneous
process, one obtains signiﬁcant eﬃciency gains. Furthermore, these gains are so impor-
tant that the welfare estimates can be calculated by using the anchoring model with
heterogeneity rather than the single bounded model. This contradicts the result by
Herriges and Shogren (1996) who use a homogeneous anchoring model and observe sub-
stantial eﬃciency losses.
145 Conclusion
In this article, we follow a line of argument suggesting that anchoring exists but is not
uniformally distributed acrros the population. To that extent, we present a method
that is able to identify respondents who are more likely to anchor, and respondents who
are not, on the basis of a single open-ended question with which we want to elicit free
associations. Depending on the answers, we discriminate between two groups of indi-
viduals, namely the conformists and the non-conformists respectively. While the ﬁrst
group responds in more standard terms, the latter give more individualistic answers. We
therefore show that it is possible to control for anchoring bias. The interesting aspect for
CV practitioners is that we still experience eﬃciency gains over single bounded dichoto-
mous choice by exploiting the heterogeneity in anchoring eﬀects. This result stands in
contrast to Herriges and Shogren (1996) who propose a model with homogeneous an-
choring throughout the population and ﬁnd important losses of eﬃciency with respect
to the single-bounded model.
Finally, how can we explain that non-conformists are less prone to anchoring? More
investigation is required to answer this question. Our suggestion is that non-conformists
have already a much more elaborated view on the subject, which does not conform
to the “stereotypical” representation of the Camargue. They are not citing the most
“obvious” reasons why they are visiting the Camargue (fauna, birds, horses, ﬂamingos
etc), but have a more “constructed” discourse, which reﬂects their own personal opinion
on the Camargue. In that sense, we identify people with more “experience” on their
subject, which may give raise to stronger opinions and preferences. Arguably, people
with enhanced preferences are more likely to behave according to standard economic
rationality. This means that in our setting, non-conformists attach much more impor-
tance to their own prior value of the object and are not inﬂuenced by the bidding values
presented to them in the CV questionnaire. The general line of thought parallels ex-
perimental ﬁndings, which show that experienced subjects are more likely to conform
to standard economic rationality. While one can rely on repetition in an experimental
setting (Grether 1980), or clearly identiﬁed experienced subjects (List 2004), to come
up with this conclusion, we associate “repetition” and “experience” with non-conformist
representations of the subject under consideration.
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